Public administration scholars tend to take for granted that organizational adaptation is important. This common notion that public organizations must adapt to stay alive has not been put to the test in the field of public administration, however. Intriguingly, organization ecologists find that adaptation does not matter and might even be counterproductive for individual organizations. They argue that the absence of adaptation-which they refer to as structural inertiaactually enhances the likelihood of survival. But organization ecologists focus mostly on nonpublic organizations. This prompts the question whether adaptation in public organizations really matters. In this article, we test these contrasting claims (while controlling for design features) on a population of U.S. federal independent public agencies (n 5 142). Our findings suggest a subtle narrative. We conclude that proactive adaptation increases termination hazards. But inertia does not seem to significantly enhance survival chances.
| AD APTAT ION VER S US IN ERTIA
In this section, we discuss two competing theories about the effects of adaptation. We articulate the mechanisms underlying these theories to explain why they yield opposing empirical predictions. We start with the idea that organizational adaptation should be rewarded with greater agency survival. We then present the idea that such adaptation is risky and increases the chances of demise.
| The logic of adaptation
We define adaptation as the organizational capacity to implement changes that restore or maintain a fit with the ever-changing expectations and values of key stakeholders. We thus define adaptation as a goal-oriented activity, and not as the random outcome of small changes.
Many studies in organizational sociology and public administration suggest, if not assume, that only those organizations that continuously adapt in response to changes in their environment can stay alive (Child, 1972; Drazin & van de Ven, 1985; Goodsell, 2011; Moore & Kraatz, 2011) . The underlying assumption is that organizations require a minimal degree of explicit and implicit support from key stakeholders; without the support of such stakeholders, organizations cannot attract the resources required to survive.
An emerging mismatch between the expectations of stakeholders and the perceived performance of an organization is thought to have negative consequences for a public organization. Such a mismatch may trigger intense discussion about the organization's way of operating, inviting change (Alink, Boin, & 't Hart, 2001; Ansell & Vogel, 2006; Crozier, 1964) .
While many scholars consider adaptation important, they do not claim it is easy. Robert Merton (1949) famously described how public organizations attract a certain type of personality that resists change. Downs (1967, p. 9) argues that older organizations tend to be less flexible, "reducing the bureau's ability to adjust to new circumstances." It is hard to change the institutionalized features of an organization, especially when these embody proven success formulas.
In fact, it may be easier for public organizations not to change and to "'rely on a certain amount of inertia" (Downs, 1967, p. 8) . Public organizations can resist change by building autonomy (Hargrove & Glidewell, 1990; Selznick, 1957; Wilson, 1989) , creating a buffer between organizational routines and external influences (cf. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Thompson, 1967) . But "few bureaus ever achieve such perfect autonomy" (Downs, 1967, p. 9) .
Adaptation comes in different forms. It can be either proactive (anticipating the perceived need to change) or reactive (after a crisis or following the direct orders of stakeholders) (Ansell, Boin, & Farjoun, 2015; Sch€ on, 1973) . Proactive change seems riskier, as there is no apparent need to instigate change. Leaders will have to work harder to convince employees of the need for change than is the case after an institutional crisis.
Adaptation can come in small steps (incremental change) or in a comprehensive radical reform program leading to paradigmatic change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Hall, 1993) . Many scholars recognize a hierarchy of adaptation, assuming that small changes are easier to accomplish than large-scale, paradigmatic changes (e.g., Genschel, 1997; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Lindner & Rittberger, 2003; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986 ). Yet, scholars also note that large-scale change is possible when crises provide so-called "windows of opportunity" (Alink et al., 2001; Cortell & Peterson, 1999; Kingdon, 1984) .
| The logic of inertia
The ecology school in the field of organization theory offers a contrasting perspective on the effects of organization-level adaptation. These scholars argue that organizational adaptation is both risky and hard to achieve. Their research suggests that the absence of adaptation enhances an organization's survival chances. For an individual organization, weathering turbulence is therefore much wiser than changing to accommodate it (cf. Boyne & Meier, 2009b) .
Ecologists try to "understand the forces that shape organizational structures over long time spans" (Freeman & Hannan, 1989, p. 426) . Organizational adaptation is not one of those forces, these scholars contend. Rather, "most of the variability in organizational structures comes about through the creation of new organizations and organizational forms and the replacement of old ones" (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, p. 150) .
These scholars do not deny that organizations change. In fact, "organizational changes of some kinds occur frequently and organizations sometimes even manage to make radical changes in strategies and structures" (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, p. 149) . But such adaptations do not affect their survival chances. Effective adaptation happens at the (macro) population level rather than the (micro) organizational level: New forms emerge, rendering existing ones obsolete in the competition over scarce resources.
Ecology scholars do not believe that individual organizations are capable of adapting in an effective and timely manner to dynamic environments. Organizations are not "rational, flexible and speedy adapters to changing environmental circumstances" (Freeman & Hannan, 1989, p. 426) . Their research appears to confirm that individual organizations are "structurally inert" or "relatively inert"-meaning that they rarely have the capacity to make meaningful or timely adaptations (Aldrich, 1999, pp. 43-48) .
There are at least three reasons why adaptation at the level of individual organizations is unlikely to be effective. First, the process of developing and implementing change always incurs a wide range of transaction costs (Barnett & Carroll, 1995; Gingrich, 2015) . Change proposals usually generate resistance, which "tend to generate short-run costs that are high enough that organizational leaders will forego the planned reorganization" (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 931) . Organizational ecologists expect that the costs rise as one proceeds up the hierarchy from peripheral to core change. But it is these latter, more fundamental changes that are usually needed to stay afloat in dynamic environments.
A second reason is that organizational leaders do not have the information or cognitive capacities required to design the changes that are needed to fit a rapidly changing and complex environment-an assessment ecologists share with many public administration scholars. As Hannan and Freeman (1977, p. 931) remind us, "leaders do not obtain anything close to full information on activities within the organization and environmental contingencies facing the subunits." But even if there was an all-seeing leader, she would likely not have the intellectual capacities required to map out effective changes that keep organization and environment in a tight fit. Freeman and Hannan (1989, p. 426 ) thus reject what they call the "heroic images of managers" that we often encounter in the reform literature.
A third reason is timing. Even if organizations would manage to design and implement sensible changes, environmental dynamics tend to outpace these changes (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; P eli, 1997) . Organizational leaders may be smart, but they cannot outsmart their environment. Organizations may change, but it is usually too little, too late (Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004) . As Moore and Kraatz (2011, p. 850) argued in their study of the U.S. savings and loan industry, "the ability to change itself is no guarantee to adaptive success." 2 From an ecological perspective, it is risky for an organization to change in response to environmental shifts. Ecological scholars stress the benefits of stability, which they consider a valuable organizational characteristic. Stakeholders, from customers to politicians, expect organizations (private and public) to be accountable, reliable, and consistent. Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 153) argue that "the modern world favors collective actors that can demonstrate or at least reasonably claim a capacity for reliable performance and can account rationally for their actions" (cf. Meyer & Rowan, 1977) .
Adaptation undermines the legitimacy derived from accountability, reliability, and consistency. Organizations should therefore not change their identity or their legally sanctioned modus operandi.
Ecologists find that inert organizations-corporations that shun adaptation-are more likely to survive than their ever-adapting counterparts. It logically follows that organizational inertia-the absence of adaptation-is the prescribed survival strategy (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Wezel & van Witteloostuijn, 2006) .
The question is whether these findings hold for individual public organizations. We should keep in mind that the ecological perspective aims to explain "why there are so many (or few) kinds of organization" (Freeman & Hannan, 1989, p. 430) ; they are less interested in the effects of adaptation (which is just one possible answer to their question; cf. Elston, 2014) . Moreover, they are interested in populations-that is, in "aggregates of organizations rather than members" (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 934) . A population-think of construction firms, educational organizations, voluntary associations, semiconductor manufacturers, or daily newspapers-is marked by a common form. Population ecology seeks to explain why certain organizational forms fit certain environments. Certain "fixed repertoires of action" work in certain environments. Shifting environments are nicer to some than to others. "The diversity of organizational forms is isomorphic to the diversity of the environments" (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 939) .
| TOWARD HYPOTHESES
We are interested in studying the effects of adaptation on the survival chances of public organizations. We discuss two very different schools of thought. One assumes the critical importance of organizational adaptation: An organization must change to survive. The other school points out that individual adaptation is unlikely to be successful, and more likely to further the gap between performance and expectations. These scholarly traditions provide us with two possible, and opposing, effects:
Hypothesis 1: A public organization's adaptation is positively associated with its likelihood of survival.
Hypothesis 1alt: A public organization's adaptation is negatively associated with its likelihood of survival.
In our theoretical discussion, we speculated that the timing of an organization's adaptive efforts may matter. Proactive change is unforced and agency driven; it is not imposed on the organization by its political or regulatory environment. Reactive change is a direct reaction to an external (legal) intervention. Based on the public administration logic of adaptation, we may argue that proactive change is more likely to be effective than reactive change, as the former allows for a certain degree of latitude in shaping the way change is implemented (Ansell et al., 2015) . The organizational ecology logic of inertia, in contrast, argues that proactive change is best avoided: Change should only be initiated, if at all, when enforced on the organization. This gives rise to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Proactive change by a public organization is positively associated with its likelihood of survival.
Hypothesis 2alt: Proactive change by a public organization is negatively associated with its likelihood of survival.
Hypothesis 3: Reactive change by a public organization is positively associated with its likelihood of survival.
Hypothesis 3alt: Reactive change by a public organization is negatively associated with its likelihood of survival.
| RESEA RCH DESIGN

| Case selection
We test our hypotheses on a set of 142 U.S. federal public agencies (see the Appendix for a complete list). 3 We constructed a detailed data set of the federal public agencies that are listed in the U.S. Government Manual (USGM) during the period 1935-2011 as "independent agency" for at least 1 year of their existence. All these agencies have their own "entry" (section) in the USGM, which logs fairly detailed information that allows us to collect, code, and compare data on those agencies. 4 The USGM contains information on "creation and authority," "purpose," and "organization." The information is annually supplied by the agency (by filling out detailed forms).
| Independent variable: Adaptation
In our empirical analysis, we conceptualize organizational adaptation as an intended effort to implement changes to minimize the gap between external expectations and the professed rationale of the organization's goals and actions. Such changes may be implemented because the organization is forced to do so by external pressure or because organizational leaders choose to do so. As organizations change all the time, the question is what we should count as adaptive behavior. We consider mission change as an indicator of adaptive behavior. A mission indicates how an organization brings incompatible goals together. Following Selznick (1957) , we assume that an organization's mission statement reflects its formal commitments (as viewed by that organization). We further assume that mission statements are not easily changed (Perrow, 1986; Selznick, 1957; Wilson, 1989) . We assume that when an organization changes its mission statement, it reflects a shift in leadership perception of core values and goals (Aldrich, 1999; Goodsell, 2011; Selznick, 1957; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Wilson, 1989) . Mission change thus reflects organizationlevel adaptive capacity.
For each year after 1933, we used USGM information on each U.S. federal independent agency to trace and register annual mission changes. We looked for additions to mission statement and removals from mission statement. Each USGM entry was examined for newly stated purposes in its distinctly itemized mission statement (either stated separately or under the subcategory "purpose"). Each new purpose was counted as an addition to the mission statement on its first appearance in a USGM entry for that agency in a given year. We coded additions in absolute numbers. Similarly, we coded the number of purposes that were removed from the mission statement when compared to the agency's mission statement of the previous year (again, in absolute numbers). We differentiate between "minor" mission change (one change in the mission statement) and "major" mission change (two or more changes).
As expected, it appears harder to make more fundamental changes: We counted 153 major changes and 1,029 minor changes. On average, agencies saw one minor mission change in 5 years and one major change in 20 years. Intriguingly, there is quite some variance in adaptive behavior. Forty-two agencies never changed their mission (6 did it once, and 12 agencies did it twice). This seems to confirm the idea that organizations tend to be inert. Yet, 13 agencies changed their mission at least 20 times.
We are also interested to see if the timing of adaptation matters. Does unprompted change (before a legislative intervention) or prompted change (in reaction to, and hence after, a legislative intervention) have a different effect on survival? We registered the number of legislative interventions introduced to the organization. This information can be found in the USGM. 5 We then make a distinction between proactive change (1-or 2-year lead), contemporaneous change (in the year of legislative intervention) and reactive change (1-or 2-year lag) vis-a-vis legislative interventions targeting the focal agency.
| Dependent variable: Survival
To study the effects of adaptation, we focus on survival chances or durability of U.S. federal independent public agencies. We define durability as the likelihood of an agency being terminated in a given year. Defining termination (and creation) of organizations is no easy task. We kept our definitions as closely as possible to those of scholars who struggled with this challenge before us (e.g., Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Greasley & Hanretty, 2015; Lewis, 2002 Lewis, , 2003 MacCarthaigh, 2014; Meyer, 1985; Rolland & Roness, 2011) . We consider organizations terminated when they are explicitly mentioned as terminated or abolished in the USGM (and without any indication of continuity beyond this official termination), split into two or more new organizations (secession), absorbed into another office, or merged with another office. We took the date specified by law or executive order (if available) as end date, and otherwise coded the termination date according to the USGM. Seventy-four of the 142 agencies (52%) that were present in the USGM since 1933 had ceased to exist on December 31, 2011. 7 The presence of survivors implies right censorship, which means that the outcome in terms of survival is unknown. The 20 cases (14%) that were established before 1933 are left-censored. Fifteen percent of the population (n 5 22) did not "live" longer than 5 years. Most terminated agencies (n 5 41; 55% of all terminated agencies) were abolished within 12 years after their creation. Eight of the terminated agencies were merged, replaced, or otherwise changed formally and structurally. Three were replaced by a different agency with similar functions (n 5 3; 4%), 4 were absorbed into a larger agency (n 5 4; 5%), and just 1 merged with an agency of equal size and responsibilities (n 5 1; <1%).
| Control variables
There are, of course, other explanations for survival. The most prominent alternative explanation is offered by Lewis (2002, p. 103 ; see also Lewis, 2003 Lewis, , 2004 , who shows that "brute public authority to insulate agencies from the influence of other actors" enhanced survival chances in his population of American federal government organizations. According to Lewis (2004) , organizations that are properly "hardwired" at birth live longer. His findings suggest that institutional birth features matter more than performance or adaptation later in life. If we want to study the effects of adaptation, we must control for this alternative explanation. On creation, many agencies are equipped with a commission or board structure, as opposed to a single administrator, with the intention of insulating them from political interference (Lewis, 2004) . To control for these differences in governing structures, we differentiated between agencies that at time of birth were endowed with a board or commission structure (coded 1), and those agencies that are not (coded 0). Each agency description in the USGM commences with a listing of job titles in which board and commission members are mentioned in a separate section.
Another design variable for which we control is the presence or absence of a sunset clause, which is a provision that specifies when an organization will cease to exist. A sunset clause, assigned a 1 code, limits the expected lifespan of an agency. We scored any formal manifestation of transient intentions for the agency as the presence of a sunset clause. These include stipulations about a fixed budget for the entire lifespan, attainment of a specific goal, or an official cutoff date. If none of these preconditions are mentioned in the first listing of USGM, we coded a 0.
Following Lewis (2003) , we also control for legislative origin. Agencies that are created after lengthy legislative procedures, involving heavy scrutiny and majority requirements, are thought to be less susceptible to termination than those agencies created by executive actions. To determine to which extent the legislature was involved in the creation process of agencies in our population, we traced the inception mandates of each agency in the USGM and in the USGM's History of Agency Organizational Changes (2011). We coded agencies initiated by act with a 1 as having a "strong legislative origin," those that had a reorganization plan at their basis with a 2, those established by an executive order with a 3, and those initiated by departmental or military order, which arguably could be classified as having the weakest legislative origin, with a code 4.
To control for agency size, we used the Budget of the United States Government (1933 Government ( -2011 to retrieve the budgets of all agencies for each year during their existence. After calculating the budget median of our population, we ranked the agencies from smallest to largest budget. The agencies in the first quartile are categorized as a small budget agency (coded 1), and agencies in the second, third, and fourth quartiles are considered to be large budget agencies (coded 0).
In times of war, federal budget routines tend to be disturbed. Hence, the years of the following wars are coded as war years (coded 1): World War II (1941 -1945 ), Korean War (1950 -1953 , Vietnam War (1965 -1975 ), Gulf War (1990 
| The model
We used event-history analysis (Tuma & Hannan, 1984) to empirically estimate the termination or mortality hazard of each agency in our population. We formally define mortality hazard as:
which reads as the likelihood that an agency ceases to exist between its age u and u1Du, provided that it did not exit at or prior to u. We use a semiparametric Cox proportional hazard rate specification (Cox, 1972) in modeling the mortality hazard, which is a product of an unspecified baseline hazard, l 0 (t), and a vector x t specifying the influences of covariates:
Results not reported here indicate that qualitatively similar results are obtained when employing piecewise exponential models (results available on request).
| FINDINGS
We present our findings in a set of tables. Table 1 provides means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values, and correlations. Table 2 presents the results of our event-history analysis. We use four models. Model 1 shows the effects of the control variables. Model 2 takes into account the pair of adaptation variables relating to additions and removals in mission statements. Models 3 and 4 include the variables related to the timing of mission change vis-a-vis legislative intervention. We report odds ratios. A coefficient below 1 implies a positive effect on the likelihood of survival; a coefficient above 1 indicates a negative impact. 
Note.
Correlations above |0.03| are significant at the .05 level. Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence that adaptation matters, either by enhancing or limiting the chances of survival (Hypotheses 1 and 1alt) . Although additions to the mission statement appear to be consistently negatively related to the likelihood of termination, and removals from the mission statement seem to positively affect the hazard, both effects are not statistically significant. We must therefore conclude that mission change does not affect the likelihood of survival. At the same time, we do not find any effects for inertia.
When we take into account the timing of mission change (Hypotheses 2 and 3), we must conclude that proactive change is very risky. Model 3 shows that changing the mission statement a year prior to a legislative change significantly elevates the mortality hazard by over 7 times. Even the co-occurrence of mission change and legislative intervention in the same year significantly undermines survival chances.
8 Reactive change with a 1-year lag, in contrast, lowers the mortality hazard (marginally significant at p < .10). This supports Hypothesis 2alt. When we extend the lead and lagged effects from 1 year to 2 years (Model 4), we find similar results. This extension should deal better with concerns about autocorrelation and multicollinearity, and turns out to have substantially better model fit (2302.5 vs. 2301.7, with identical degrees of freedom). Changing an agency's mission statement 2 years a priori again proves to be extremely risky. Mission statement changes in the same year as a legislative intervention are still statistically significant and positive, suggesting a greater mortality hazard when the two coincide. Reactive change with a lag of 2 years in turn appears again to lower mortality, providing evidence for Hypothesis 3. All this suggests that responsive agencies are much less likely to be sanctioned via termination than proactive agencies (we return to this in the Discussion).
The control variables do not produce surprises. Small agencies (those in the smallest quartile in terms of budget) are most vulnerable to termination. The agencies that were started with a sunset clause and those with a weak legislative origin ran a higher risk of being terminated. 9 The other control variables are nonsignificant in all four model specifications.
We ran a series of robustness checks, reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. Basically, our results are not affected by: (a) including a public corporation dummy (Model 5), (b) adding a control for young agencies (a dummy for agencies that exited before turning 5; Model 6), (c) using different size quartiles (Model 7), (d) removing agencies established with sunset clauses (Model 8), and (e) entering two proxies for political turnover (as captured by dummies for unfriendly president and unfriendly majority; Model 9).
| DISCUSSION: OR GA NIZA TIONAL ADA PTATION AND INSTITUTIONA L DY NAMICS
This article's central question is whether adaptation matters for public sector organizations. We started out with the common assumption in the public administration literature that adaptation is important if public organizations are to survive and prosper. We contrasted this assumption with the organizational ecology argument that organizational adaptation will harm rather than enhance a public organization's survival chance. We examined both perspectives on adaptation in the population of 142 U.S. federal independent agencies in the period 1933-2011, focusing on mission change as a solid indicator of an organization's capacity to adapt. In addition, we looked into the impact of the timing of adaptation.
Our findings are quite surprising. It turns out that reactive change vis-a-vis legislative intervention enhances the odds of survival; but proactive mission change (1 or 2 years before the legislative intervention) and contemporaneous change (in the year of the intervention) substantially increase the likelihood of termination. Intriguingly, this would imply that public agencies should not engage in proactive change (cf. Ansell et al., 2015) . It is better to react to legislative intervention by adapting the mission accordingly, preferably after some time has passed. This finding goes against the grain of many studies that prescribe an active role for bureaucratic leaders, casting them as "entrepreneurs" (Boin, 2001; Hargrove & Glidewell, 1990; Ricucci, 1995) . Our findings suggest that bureaucratic rule following-bureaucratic responsiveness to political decisions-better serves the interest of a public organization.
Why is proactive change so risky? There are at least two possible explanations. First, agencies that adapt proactively take a calculated risk. They change a mission that has not been subjected to political scrutiny and that has not been delegitimized. Such change is therefore likely to attract political attention, possibly nurturing a perception that the organization has problems. It feeds on the idea that only underperforming agencies would change their mission (Andrews, Boyne, & Enticott, 2006; Boyne, 2006) . A second reason lies in the costs of reorganization (a well-documented impediment to reform); smart organizations only do this when they absolutely must.
It is possible that we did not adequately measure organizational adaptation. We looked at changes to the mission of an organization, assuming that this type of change is an indicator of "core" adaptation. But organizations may well adapt constantly, and much more effectively, by a series of small, incremental changes in policies and tools (second-order or peripheral changes that are much harder to measure).
Also, we need to be cautious about the divergence between "talk" and "action" in organizations (Brunsson, 1989) . It may well be that the mission, and the adaptation thereof, masks what the organization really does. We need in-depth qualitative case studies to probe into such dynamics (see, for fascinating examples, Doig, 2001; Hargrove, 1994) .
Our study did not explicitly measure levels of political support for public organizations. Some organizations could be at risk for termination because they have weaker support whereas other organizations can be inert because they enjoy high levels of support. An in-depth qualitative approach is needed to find out if external support or interest group pressure provide alternative explanations for both adaptation and survival.
Finally, it is possible that the extent of environmental change is not fully captured by equating it to legislative interventions. Our notion of preemptive change does take into account the possibility that agencies respond to other environmental prompts such as funding change, presidential unilateral action, and court cases. We assumed that changes in the external environment eventually translate into legislative changes, but the relative inactivity of Congress in recent years casts some doubt on this assumption.
These limitations point to promising avenues of future research. One way to make progress is to code the perceptions of an agency's performance (cf. Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) . It would also be interesting to code for different types of organizational adaptation strategies, both "deep" or fundamental and "superficial" or incremental, to explore whether the nature of change and the temporal patterns of change types may matter. Future research could also compare our findings with studies of similar populations in other countries (Laegreid, Rolland, Roness, & Agotnes, 2010; MacCarthaigh, 2014; Yesilkagit & Christensen, 2011) , and of other types of public organizations.
Our findings offer inconclusive support for the insights derived from organizational ecology. We find no evidence that inertia has an effect on survival chances. These insights have been much applied in the business and sociology literatures, but not so much in the study of public organizations. Future work should extend the ecological analysis of public organizations by further exploring alternative mechanisms, a prominent example being the density dependence conception of organizational selection, which organizational ecology argues is a much more powerful force than organizational adaptation (Hannan & Freeman, 1977 .
This article is one of the first to investigate the effects of adaptation on survival. Our findings cast doubt on the widespread belief in the benefits of organizational adaptation. It may well be that future research rescues the belief in adaptation from the forces of inertia. In the absence of more positive findings, we must caution against perspectives that sing the praise of proactive adaptation. Waiting for a clear order-Wilsonian responsiveness-may be most beneficial to an agency's survival prospects.
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NOTE S
1 To be sure, we are not seeking to explain organizational survival. We want to study whether adaptation has effects, and we study these effects in terms of survival. 2 Moore and Kraatz (2011) argue that adaptation is likely to be more effective when organizations change slowly in response to their environment, and stay close to their organizational competences (p. 861). 3 We excluded cabinet bureaus because the USGM contains little or inconsistent information on them. One might also argue that their dependence on the whims of executives is itself an explanatory factor for survival. Neither agency components nor suboffices were included, as by their very nature they perish much more easily and frequently than the independent agencies they are part of. 4 For reasons of size, organizational unity, and distinctiveness, we excluded: (a) bilateral or multilateral organizations; (b) monuments and celebrations (e.g., bicentennials) commissions; (c) foreign claims commissions; (d) committees, advisory councils, or boards consisting of only ex officio members (such as the Secretary of Defense and State together advising the president as "Council X or Y") or functionaries or representatives of other organizations, which do not form a standing organization; and (e) agencies with only a single state purpose (e.g., Delaware River Basin Commission, Virginia State Boundary Commission, and Alaska Power Administration). 5 Legislative intervention can be introduced by executive authority (executive or departmental order; reorganization plans) or legislative authority (the act of law). Following Lewis (2003) , we take intervention by act of law as an indicator of important shifts in an agency's environment. 6 We took a sample of 20 cases from our population (representing both "short-lived" and durable agencies) and checked intercoder reliability between the two researchers who did all the coding work. Out of 12,800 observations, we found 665 differences, which results in intercoder reliability of 94.8%. Each difference in observation (even if this pertained to only a fraction difference on a code scale) was interpreted most strictly, as full difference. 7 Due to unavailability of data for 2012/2013, we decided to take December 31, 2011 as an artificial end point. 8 Co-concurrence may actually indicate a form of proactive change, due to the lag time between legislative change and the materialization of mission changes in the USGM. 9 As innovation and reinvention might be less likely in temporary organizations, we estimated the same set of models on agencies that did not have an expiration date. More specifically, we tested the models on the population without sunset clauses (excluding 17 cases). We did not find a difference in effects. Wezel, F. C., & van Witteloostuijn, A. (2006) . From scooters to choppers: Product portfolio change and organizational failure, evidence from the UK motorcycle industry Note. Hazard ratios are reported; robust standard errors in parentheses. †p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
